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Purpose. Lie-tellers tend to tell embedded lies within interviews. In the context of
intelligence-gathering interviews, human sourcesmay disclose information aboutmultiple
events, some of which may be false. In two studies, we examined when lie-tellers from
low- and high-context cultures start reporting false events in interviews and to what
extent they provide a similar amount of detail for the false and truthful events. Study 1
focused on lie-tellers’ intentions, and Study 2 focused on their actual responses.
Methods. Participants were asked to think of one false event and three truthful events.
Study 1 (N = 100) was an online study in which participants responded to a questionnaire
about where they would position the false event when interviewed and they rated the
amount of detail they would provide for the events. Study 2 (N = 126) was an
experimental study that involved interviewing participants about the events.
Results. Although therewas no clear preference for lie position, participants seemed to
report the false event at the end rather than at the beginning of the interview. Also,
participants provided a similar amount of detail across events. Results on intentions
(Study 1) partially overlapped with results on actual responses (Study 2). No differences
emerged between low- and high-context cultures.
Conclusions. This research is a first step towards understanding verbal cues that assist
investigative practitioners in saving their cognitive and time resources when detecting
deception regardless of interviewees’ cultural background.More research on similar cues
is encouraged.
Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, codenamed ‘Curveball’, is an Iraqi defector who gave
intelligence about clandestine biological weapons in Iraq to German and American
Intelligence Services, after which a war was waged on Iraq (Chulov & Pidd, 2011). It was
later discovered that Curveball gave fabricated intelligence. He claimed that he was
hoping that, based on his fabrications, the West would end the dictatorship regime of
Saddam Hussein (Chulov & Pidd, 2011).
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There aremany similar cases inwhichhuman sources lie to handling officersmotivated
by a desire to receive rewards, obtain settlement status, and/or protect one’s network
(Miller, 2011; Stabile, 2014). Inmany instances, to convince their handlers they are telling
the truth, sources may use embedded lies: incorporating false details within a truthful
narrative (Leins, Fisher & Ross, 2013; Nahari, 2018). In contrast to outright lies that are
primarily based on fabrications, embedded lies require fewer cognitive resources on the
part of lie-tellers, enabling them to make their account more convincing and to present it
with greater detail and consistency (Deeb et al., 2018; Verigin, Meijer, Vrij, & Zauzig,
2019).
Sources often work for a long time with practitioners (Maguire & John, 1995; U.S.
Department of Justice, 2006) and hereby often discuss multiple events, some of which
may be false. The current research examined false events embedded within truthful
events, simulating intelligence-gathering interviews. Across two studies,we compared lie-
tellers’ intentions and actual responses concerning where they would position the false
event in relation to three truthful events and the extent to which they provide a similar
amount of detail when reporting the truthful and false events. Study 1 is pre-registered on
https://osf.io/5eubs and Study 2 on https://osf.io/q84au; the data and Appendix S1 can
also be found on these links.
Lie position as an indicator of deception
To our knowledge, there is only one study (Leal, Vrij, Nahari, & Mann, 2016) that tested
when lie-tellers start lying. In an insurance claim setting, participants freely claimed eight
items either genuinely or falsely. The average first falsely claimed itemwas reported in the
third position (Mfirst lie = 3.17). Participants reported they wanted to make the falsely
claimed items less detectable by mixing them with the genuine items. Their strategy was
to start the claim by providing verifiable information (e.g., presenting a receipt) to appear
honest and to gain trust before starting to lie. The current research attempted to extend
these findings, examining when lie-tellers start lying in interviews involving multiple
events. We expected our results to match those of Leal and colleagues, with participants
embedding the lie later in the interview.
Detail as an indicator of deception
Wewere interested in examiningwhether participantswould provide a similar amount of
detail for the truthful and false events. We are aware of only a few studies that examined a
similar research question (Deeb et al., 2017; Palena, Caso, & Vrij, 2019; Verigin et al.,
2019), but they used different designs and dependent variables and reached different
conclusions. The study by Palena et al. (2019) most closely resembled ours. The study
involved truth-tellers reporting two events genuinely and lie-tellers lying about one of the
events. Truth-tellers provided a similar amount of detail for the two events, but lie-tellers
provided more details for the truthful event than the false event. The authors speculated
that lie-tellers may have found it easier to report and remember truthful details, thus
unknowingly enhancing opportunities of detecting their deception. In line with these
findings, we expected lie-tellers in the current research to report more details for the
truthful events than the false event.
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Cross-cultural research on deception
We examined cross-cultural differences in deception and focused on two communication
styles, high- and low-context cultural dimensions. Although there are different ways in
which cross-cultural differences can be examined (such as collectivism vs. individualism;
Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010; independence vs. interdependence; Kim, Kam,
Sharkey, & Singelis, 2008), we chose communication style because wewere interested in
verbal cues to deception. High-context and low-context cultures may be interpreted on a
continuum, and cultures may show a mix of these communication styles; however, each
culture tends to have a dominant communication style (Hall, 1976). High-context cultures
(e.g., Middle East, Latin America) communicate via implicit messages that rely on context,
whereas low-context cultures (e.g., United States, Norway) are more explicit during
communicationwith themeaning of themessage derived from the content of themessage
itself (Hall, 1976). To illustrate, a person from a high-context culture may say s/he agrees
with you when in fact s/he does not but wants to display what s/he believes is polite
behaviour. In contrast, a person from a low-context culture would be more confronta-
tional and is likely to explicitly disagree with you (Copeland & Griggs, 1986).
We are aware of three deception studies that looked at cross-cultural communication
styles but they examined different cues, used different designs, and reached different
conclusions which make it difficult to reconcile the findings. Two studies found that
interviewees displayed behaviour manifested in their culture regardless of whether they
were lying or not (Leal, Vrij, Vernham, et al., 2018; Rotman, 2012), but a third study found
cues to deception regardless of whether interviewees came from high- or low-context
cultures (Van der Zee, Poppe, Taylor, & Anderson, 2019). In the current research, we
explored differences between the two cultural groups for lie position and for the amount
of truthful and false details. In Study 1, we did not predict cultural differences a priori but
we conducted post-hoc exploratory analyses given the variety in the cultural background
of our sample. However, we systematically examined cultural differences in Study 2.
Deceptive intentions
In Study 1, we examined lie-tellers’ intentions concerning the order of truthful and
false events within the same interview and the amount of detail they planned to
provide for each event. Study 2 was an experimental study that involved an interview
to test actual lie position and amount of detail, thus measuring actual responses. To
what extent would the intentions in Study 1 and actual responses in Study 2 show
overlap which each other?
According to the theory of planned behaviour, attitudes, subjective norms, and
perceived behavioural control predict intentions and the overall model predicts
behaviours (Ajzen, 2011; Stone, Jawahar, & Kisamore, 2010). When individuals are
confronted with constraints in a setting, perceived behavioural control is low which
weakens the intention–behaviour correlation (Ajzen, 2011). On the one hand, in an
investigative interview context where the stakes are high, particularly for lie-tellers, the
cognitive load induced by probing questions and the act of lying diminishes lie-tellers’
cognitive resources (Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011). Thus, intentions to lie
and to control one’s behaviour to provide a convincing statement may not predict actual
behaviour (Vrij, Semin, & Bull, 1996). On the other hand, the propensity of lie-tellers to
prepare for interviews and to stick to their cover story (Hartwig, Granhag, Str€omwall, &
Doering, 2010) enables them to have more control during the interview, and thus, their
intentions to provide a convincing statement are more likely to be fulfilled. Similarly, the
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act of placing a false event in a certain positionwhenmultiple events are reported and the
amount of detail to be providedmay be prepared in advance. Thus, intentions concerning
lie position and amount of detail are likely to alignwith actual behaviour (responses) if lie-
tellers perceive and possess control over such behaviour in the interview.
STUDY 1
Study 1 was an online study that examined lie-tellers’ intentions on where they would
position a false event if they are asked to report four events of which one is false and three
are truthful. The false event could be reported at the beginning of the interview (first
position), in the middle of the interview (second or third position), or at the end of the
interview (fourth position). We were also interested in the amount of detail lie-tellers
intend to provide for the false and truthful events.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. Lie-tellers will report that they would place the false event in the second or
third position as opposed to the first or fourth position.
Hypothesis 2. Lie-tellers will report that they would provide more details for the truthful
events than the false event.
Method
Recruitment of participants
The studywas posted onAmazonMechanical Turk (MTurk) and on socialmedia platforms
(Facebook, Twitter) in different countries (e.g., Netherlands, Lebanon). We also
announced the study to individuals who previously expressed interest in taking part in
studies conducted at the university’s Department of Psychology. In addition, we used a
snowballing procedure. MTurk participants were paid $0.50; other participants did not
receive any reward. Participants were eligible to participate in the study if they were able
to understand and write English at an advanced level. Self-reports were used as the study
did not involve an interview and participants needed to have basic knowledge of English
to comprehend instructions. More details can be found in the Appendix S1.
Participants’ demographics
A total of 100 participants (61 females and 35 males) were recruited. One participant
selected ‘other’ for gender, another preferred not to mention gender, and two did not
indicate their gender. Approximately half of the sample was recruited onMTurk (n = 54)
and the remaining half through snowballing (n = 22), via the Department’s database
(n = 13), and on social media platforms (n = 11). Age ranged between 18 and 71 years,
Mage = 36.32 years, SDage = 13.13. Thirteen participants did not indicate their age.
Participants’ ethnicity was Caucasian (n = 58), Arab (n = 25), Asian (n = 7), Hispanic
(n = 6), African (n = 2), and Mixed (n = 2).
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Procedure
The online study involved participants choosing from a list of social and personal events
(e.g., went on a trip abroad, met a famous person) three events that happened to them in
the past 6 months. Theywere then asked to fabricate an eventwhich does not include any
truthful details and claim they have experienced it in the past 6 months. They were led to
believe that they will be interviewed online by one of the six lie detection experts, of
whom two are available at all times. To motivate participants, they were instructed that if
they are not convincing, theywill have towrite a statement about the events. Participants
were then directed to another page to complete a questionnaire prior to the supposed
interview on which they rated on 7-point scales (1 = not at all and 7 = extremely) their
intentions and strategies and elaborated on them (see Appendix S1 formore details on the
procedure).
Coding
Remaining blind to the veracity of events, the first author coded open responses justifying
the (1) planned order of events, (2) planned amount of detail for events, and (3)
preparation strategies. The first author has been manually coding verbal statements for
cues to deception for many years and is thus experienced in coding. The author
formulated categories based on participants’ responses to open questions. Similar
responses were grouped together in a single category, with each category describing the
theme of responses. For example, the responses ‘Make details similar to the lie’ and ‘Iwant
to use the same level of detail for everything if at all possible to help obfuscate the lie’ came
under the category ‘to match the other events’ (see Table 5), because they showed that
the participant planned to provide the same amount of detail for the events. Also, the same
response from the same participant could fit into more than one category. For example,
this response from one participant ‘I think adding detail adds to the believability of the
story. Also, I want the level of detail to be sort of similar across stories’ falls under the
categories ‘more details indicate more honesty’ and ’to match the other events’ (see
Table 4).
A second coder, blind to the hypotheses and veracity of events, assigned participants’
responses to the formulated categories. Inter-rater reliabilitywas calculated usingCohen’s
kappa, j = .68, and suggested substantial agreement between coders (Hallgren, 2012).
Results
Results from the questionnaire that are not directly related to hypotheses testing (e.g.,
participants’ motivation, preparation strategies) can be found in the Appendix S1. In
general, participants were motivated to appear honest, believed they will have to write a
statement, were confident they will be believed, were genuine about the truthful events,
and used embedded details when reporting the false event.
Intentions: lie position
A one-sample chi-square test that examined whether the reported position of the false
eventwas significantlymore likely for oneof the four positions thanwouldbe expectedby
chance revealed no significant differences, v2(3) = 7.76, p = .051, Mlie position = 2.76,
SD = 1.08. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.
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Despite the rejection of Hypothesis 1, the frequencies in Table 1 show that relatively
few participants planned to start the interview with a lie. We conducted further
exploratory analyses to compare the proportion of participants who reported the false
event in the first position and the proportion of participants who reported the false event
in each of the other positions. We adjusted the p-value to .017 (.05/3) to avoid alpha level
inflation. Participants were as likely to plan to start the interview with the false event
(placing it in the first position) as theywere to plan to place it in the second, v2(1) = 3.93,
p = .047, and third positions, v2(1) = 1.68, p = .194. However, they were significantly
less likely to plan to start than to end (fourth position) the interview with the false event,
v2(1) = 7.37, p = .007.
Given the cultural diversity of our sample (see Appendix S1), we explored potential
cultural differences. A chi-square test between lie position (first, second, third, fourth) and
culture (low-context, high-context) revealed no significant differences in lie position
between high-context, M = 3.00, SD = 1.10, 95% CI [2.66, 3.34], and low-context
participants,M = 2.59, SD = 1.04, 95% CI [2.31, 2.86], v2(3) = 6.06, p = .109, Cramer’s
V = 0.25. Refer to Table 1 for frequencies.
Themost common reasons for the planned lie position (Table 2)were to be donewith
lying (if first position), to mix truthful and false events (if second and third positions), and
to adjust to the interview (if fourth position). However, the planned order of truthful
events (Table 3) was random or based on the chronological order of events.
Intentions: detail
A2 (event: truthful, deceptive) 9 4 (lie position: first, second, third, fourth) 9 2 (culture:
low-context, high-context)mixedANOVAwith event aswithin-subject factor, culture and
lie position as between-subject factors, andplanneddetails for the truthful and false events
as dependent variable revealed a significant effect for event, F(1, 92) = 4.36, p = .040,
g2 = .05. Participants planned providing more details for the truthful events (M = 5.27,
SD = 1.36, 95% CI [5.00, 5.54]) than the false event (M = 4.92, SD = 1.45, 95% CI [4.63,
5.20]). No other significant differences emerged (all ps > .124). These results supported
Hypothesis 2 that lie-tellers will plan to provide more details for the truthful events than
the false event.
The reasons given by participants for the planned amount of detail for the false event
are provided in Table 4. Participants who chose a rating of 4 or 5 on the 7-point scale
wanted to provide a moderate amount of detail to appear truthful (i.e., not too vague and
not too detailed). Participantswho chose a higher rating (6 or 7)mostly thought thatmore
details indicated more honesty, and those who chose a lower rating (1–3) mostly wanted
to provide a simple story. As for the truthful events (Table 5), participants who gave a
rating of 4 or higher wanted to be detailed because they experienced or remembered the
events. Further, the content or nature of the event did not seem to affect the amount of
detail participants provided. Tables 4 and 5 show that very few participants decided the
amount of detail based on the events’ content or significance.
STUDY 2
Study 2 was an experimental replication of Study 1, with a few differences between the
studies. Whereas Study 1 examined participants’ intentions in an online survey, Study 2
examined actual responses in an interview – with a similar focus on lie position and
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Table 1. Frequency and percentages of planned lie position (Study 1) and actual lie position (Study 2)
Lie position
Study 1 Study 2
Low-context
(n = 58)
High-context
(n = 42)
Total
(N = 100)
Low-context
(n = 66)
High-context
(n = 60)
Total
(N = 126)
First position 9 (16%) 6 (14%) 15 (15%) 10 (15%) 9 (15%) 19 (15%)
Second position 21 (36%) 7 (17%) 28 (28%) 17 (26%) 20 (33%) 37 (29%)
Third position 13 (22%) 10 (24%) 23 (23%) 20 (30%) 13 (22%) 33 (27%)
Fourth position 15 (26%) 19 (45%) 34 (34%) 19 (29%) 18 (30%) 37 (29%)
Table 2. Frequency of participants in Study 1 reporting the reasons for the chosen position of the false
event as a function of culture
Why do you choose to lie at that point during the interview? Low-context High-context
First position
To be done with the lie 3 2
The interviewer would not expect me to lie then
or would not remember the lie
1 1
To look like I have not prepared for it 1 0
To be/remain enthusiastic during the interview 1 0
Before the interviewer knows much about me 1 0
It was an easy topic 0 1
Based on the sequence/content of events 0 1
Second position
To mix the deceptive and truthful events 6 3
Based on the sequence/content of events 4 3
To adjust to the interview (questions) 4 1
Lying at the beginning or end would be too obvious 4 0
To be/remain enthusiastic during the interview 4 0
Before the interviewer knows much about me 2 0
I am not comfortable with lying so I prefer to postpone it 2 0
The interviewer wouldn’t expect me to lie then or
would not remember the lie
2 0
To be done with the lie 1 1
To match the truthful events 0 3
Third position
To mix the deceptive and truthful events 7 6
Based on the sequence/content of events 5 2
Lying at the beginning or end would be too obvious 4 0
To adjust to the interview (questions) 2 2
To establish trust with the interviewer 2 0
I am not comfortable with lying so I prefer to postpone it 1 2
To match the truthful events 1 1
Fourth position
To adjust to the interview (questions) 5 5
I am not comfortable with lying so I prefer to postpone the lie 3 4
To allow myself time to think and to organise my thoughts 2 3
To establish trust with the interviewer 2 1
To match the truthful events 1 2
To not be detailed because I never experienced the lie 0 2
Based on the sequence/content of events 0 2
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amount of detail. Recruitment of cultural groups was not systematic in Study 1, so we
addressed this methodological limitation in Study 2 by actively recruiting individuals from
low- and high-context groups residing in theUnitedKingdom. Participantswere recruited
at the University of Portsmouth. As in Study 1, participants self-reported their English
proficiency, but we expected all participants to have at least a good proficiency in English
given that knowledge of English was a requirement at the university. Previous research
has shown that verbal statements of lie-tellerswith a high level of proficiency in English do
not differ from those of native speakers (Evans, Pimentel, Pena,&Michael, 2017); hence, it
is likely that conducting the interview in English would not have affected the results. To
avoid any order effects, the instructions given about choosing the three truthful events
and the false event were counterbalanced such that in one version, the paragraph on
choosing the truthful events would come first followed by the paragraph on fabricating
the false event, and vice versa in the other version.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 3. Lie-tellers will report the false event in the second or third position as
opposed to the first or fourth position, irrespective of culture.
Hypothesis 4. Lie-tellerswill bemore detailed about the truthful events than the false event,
irrespective of culture.
Method
Participants
The study was advertised on university online platforms, to the Department’s database,
and in university buildings. A total of 126 participants took part, of which 83 (66%) were
Table 3. Frequency of participants in Study 1 and Study 2 reporting the reasons for the chosen order of
the truthful events as a function of culture
On what basis do/did you choose the
order of the truthful events?
Study 1 Study 2
Low-
context
High-
context
Low-
context
High-
context
Randomly 24 8 17 20
Chronological order 11 18 14 15
The chosen order makes the
statement more believable
8 1 0 0
I started with the most exciting/
significant event
7 7 1 3
I started with the events I remember most 5 5 35 11
The interviewer is more likely to
recall the last reported events
3 0 0 0
I placed the most exciting event in the middle 2 1 0 0
I started with the events about
which I can talk most/least
0 2 0 2
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females and 42 (33%) were males (one participant preferred not to mention gender). Age
ranged between 18 and 53 years (Mage = 23.79, SDage = 7.56). The sample included 76
Caucasians (60%), 26 Asians (20%), 11 Latin Americans (9%), seven Africans (6%), and six
ofmixed ethnicity (5%). Participants received one course credit or £5 for taking part in the
study.
Participants were allocated to the low-context or high-context culture based on their
nationality. When participants had more than one nationality, they were asked about the
nationality they identified with the most and this was used to classify them. Sixty-six
participants were allocated to the low-context culture and 60 participants to the high-
context culture.
Procedure
Participants first read instructions on a computer at the Department of Psychology that
they had to select three events they experienced in the past 6 months and to report one
false event they have never experienced. The instructions (about the three truthful events
and the false event) were counterbalanced. Participants read the same instructions as in
Study 1, in addition to an instruction that the interviewer is completely blind to the
veracity of events. Also, the false event that participants had to reportwas given to themby
the experimenter and was one of the listed events that participants first saw on the
computer (the list fromwhich they selected the three truthful events). The false eventwas
matched to a previously reported truthful event, such that participants were asked to lie
about a truthful event that a previous participant had reported. Participants were asked to
lie about the event only if they have never experienced that event or a similar event. For
example, if Participant 1 mentioned genuinely adopting a pet in the past 6 months,
Participant 2would be asked to lie about adopting a pet in the past 6 months, but only if s/
he has never adopted a pet before.
Participants were given as much time as needed to prepare for the interview. Next,
they completed a pre-interview questionnaire on their motivation, strategies, and
demographics. Then, one of two research assistants, blind to the hypotheses and to the
veracity of events, asked participants for a free recall of the events. Lastly, participants
completed a post-interview questionnaire (see Appendix S1 for more details on the
Procedure).
Coding
Interviewswere recorded, transcribed, andmanually coded for the number of details (one
score given for each event). This frequency count coding method is commonly used in
deception research and has shown to be accurate and reliable (Nahari, 2016). All nouns,
verbs, adjectives, and adverbs were coded as details. Repeated details within the same
event were coded only once. For example, the statement “For my graduation, my father
brought me to the university with his car. On the way to university, my father stopped for
coffee” includes eight details.
The first author and a second coder, bothblind to the veracity of events, first coded two
interviews to agree on the coding scheme. They then coded two other interviews and
discussed any disagreements. Afterwards, the second coder coded 20% of the interviews
and the first author coded all the interviews. Inter-rater reliability was excellent,
ICC = .93.
When and how are lies told? 9
T
a
b
le
4
.
Fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
o
fp
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
in
St
u
d
y
1
an
d
St
u
d
y
2
re
p
o
rt
in
g
th
e
re
as
o
n
s
fo
r
p
ro
vi
d
in
g
th
e
ra
te
d
am
o
u
n
t
o
fd
e
ta
il
fo
r
th
e
fa
ls
e
e
ve
n
t
as
a
fu
n
ct
io
n
o
fc
u
lt
u
re
Sc
al
e
ra
ti
n
g
W
h
y
d
o
/d
id
yo
u
ch
o
o
se
to
b
e
th
at
d
e
ta
ile
d
ab
o
u
t
th
e
fa
ls
e
e
ve
n
t?
St
u
d
y
1
St
u
d
y
2
L
o
w
-c
o
n
te
x
t
H
ig
h
-c
o
n
te
x
t
L
o
w
-c
o
n
te
x
t
H
ig
h
-c
o
n
te
x
t
7
M
o
re
d
e
ta
ils
in
d
ic
at
e
m
o
re
h
o
n
e
st
y
4
1
1
1
I
am
u
si
n
g
an
e
m
b
e
d
d
e
d
lie
2
0
0
0
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
n
at
u
re
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
t
1
1
0
0
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
tr
u
th
fu
le
ve
n
ts
1
0
0
1
T
o
co
n
fu
se
th
e
in
te
rv
ie
w
e
r
1
0
0
0
6
M
o
re
d
e
ta
ils
in
d
ic
at
e
m
o
re
h
o
n
e
st
y
7
2
6
8
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
tr
u
th
fu
le
ve
n
ts
2
2
5
6
In
cl
u
d
e
e
n
o
u
gh
d
e
ta
ils
(n
o
t
to
o
m
an
y
o
r
to
o
fe
w
)
2
1
0
0
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
n
at
u
re
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
t
2
0
0
0
I
am
u
si
n
g
an
e
m
b
e
d
d
e
d
lie
1
1
0
0
5
In
cl
u
d
e
e
n
o
u
gh
d
e
ta
ils
(n
o
t
to
o
m
an
y
o
r
to
o
fe
w
)
1
4
7
8
5
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
tr
u
th
fu
le
ve
n
ts
1
3
9
6
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
n
at
u
re
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
t
1
0
0
0
I
am
u
si
n
g
an
e
m
b
e
d
d
e
d
lie
1
0
0
0
T
o
b
e
si
m
p
le
in
m
y
ac
co
u
n
t
0
1
0
0
M
o
re
d
e
ta
ils
in
d
ic
at
e
m
o
re
h
o
n
e
st
y
0
0
1
2
1
8
4
In
cl
u
d
e
e
n
o
u
gh
d
e
ta
ils
(n
o
t
to
o
m
an
y
o
r
to
o
fe
w
)
5
1
0
7
3
T
o
b
e
si
m
p
le
in
m
y
ac
co
u
n
t
3
1
3
3
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
tr
u
th
fu
le
ve
n
ts
1
1
8
3
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
n
at
u
re
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
t
1
0
0
0
I
am
u
si
n
g
an
e
m
b
e
d
d
e
d
lie
1
0
0
0
M
o
re
d
e
ta
ils
in
d
ic
at
e
m
o
re
h
o
n
e
st
y
0
0
4
3
3
T
o
b
e
si
m
p
le
in
m
y
ac
co
u
n
t
0
2
4
2
In
cl
u
d
e
e
n
o
u
gh
d
e
ta
ils
(n
o
t
to
o
m
an
y
o
r
to
o
fe
w
)
0
1
7
3
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
n
at
u
re
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
t
0
1
0
0
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
tr
u
th
fu
le
ve
n
ts
0
0
2
1
T
o
ga
in
th
e
in
te
rv
ie
w
e
r’
s
tr
u
st
0
0
0
1
C
on
tin
ue
d
10 Haneen Deeb et al.
T
a
b
le
4
.
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
Sc
al
e
ra
ti
n
g
W
h
y
d
o
/d
id
yo
u
ch
o
o
se
to
b
e
th
at
d
e
ta
ile
d
ab
o
u
t
th
e
fa
ls
e
e
ve
n
t?
St
u
d
y
1
St
u
d
y
2
L
o
w
-c
o
n
te
x
t
H
ig
h
-c
o
n
te
x
t
L
o
w
-c
o
n
te
x
t
H
ig
h
-c
o
n
te
x
t
2
T
o
b
e
si
m
p
le
in
m
y
ac
co
u
n
t
3
3
0
0
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
n
at
u
re
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
t
3
0
0
0
E
as
ie
r
to
re
p
o
rt
fe
w
d
e
ce
p
ti
ve
d
e
ta
ils
0
0
2
1
A
p
p
e
ar
b
e
lie
va
b
le
0
0
2
0
1
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
tr
u
th
fu
le
ve
n
ts
1
0
0
0
N
ot
e.
T
h
is
q
u
e
st
io
n
is
a
fo
llo
w
-u
p
to
th
e
q
u
e
st
io
n
‘H
o
w
d
e
ta
ile
d
d
o
yo
u
p
la
n
to
b
e
/w
e
re
yo
u
w
h
e
n
re
p
o
rt
in
g
th
e
fa
ls
e
e
ve
n
t’
.
When and how are lies told? 11
T
a
b
le
5
.
Fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
o
fp
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
in
St
u
d
y
1
an
d
St
u
d
y
2
re
p
o
rt
in
g
th
e
re
as
o
n
s
fo
r
p
ro
vi
d
in
g
th
e
ra
te
d
am
o
u
n
t
o
fd
e
ta
il
fo
r
th
e
tr
u
th
fu
le
ve
n
ts
as
a
fu
n
ct
io
n
o
fc
u
lt
u
re
Sc
al
e
ra
ti
n
g
W
h
y
d
o
yo
u
ch
o
o
se
to
b
e
th
at
d
e
ta
ile
d
ab
o
u
t
th
e
tr
u
th
fu
le
ve
n
ts
?
St
u
d
y
1
St
u
d
y
2
L
o
w
-c
o
n
te
x
t
H
ig
h
-c
o
n
te
x
t
L
o
w
-c
o
n
te
x
t
H
ig
h
-c
o
n
te
x
t
7
I
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
ce
d
th
e
e
ve
n
ts
an
d
/o
r
ca
n
re
m
e
m
b
e
r
th
e
m
8
4
2
2
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
o
th
e
r
e
ve
n
ts
4
2
1
1
M
o
re
d
e
ta
ils
in
d
ic
at
e
m
o
re
h
o
n
e
st
y
0
0
2
2
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
ts
0
0
0
2
6
I
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
ce
d
th
e
e
ve
n
ts
an
d
/o
r
ca
n
re
m
e
m
b
e
r
th
e
m
9
1
0
8
5
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
o
th
e
r
e
ve
n
ts
7
1
9
4
M
o
re
d
e
ta
ils
in
d
ic
at
e
m
o
re
h
o
n
e
st
y
0
0
6
1
8
T
o
b
e
si
m
p
le
in
m
y
ac
co
u
n
t
1
1
0
0
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
ts
0
1
2
2
In
cl
u
d
e
e
n
o
u
gh
d
e
ta
ils
(n
o
t
to
o
m
an
y
o
r
to
o
fe
w
)
0
0
6
0
5
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
o
th
e
r
e
ve
n
ts
1
4
5
1
3
5
I
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
ce
d
th
e
e
ve
n
ts
an
d
/o
r
ca
n
re
m
e
m
b
e
r
th
e
m
1
6
4
6
T
o
b
e
si
m
p
le
in
m
y
ac
co
u
n
t
1
1
0
0
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
ts
0
2
0
0
In
cl
u
d
e
e
n
o
u
gh
d
e
ta
ils
(n
o
t
to
o
m
an
y
o
r
to
o
fe
w
)
0
0
7
1
M
o
re
d
e
ta
ils
in
d
ic
at
e
m
o
re
h
o
n
e
st
y
0
0
2
5
4
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
o
th
e
r
e
ve
n
ts
5
4
9
2
T
o
b
e
si
m
p
le
in
m
y
ac
co
u
n
t
4
0
1
3
I
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
ce
d
th
e
e
ve
n
ts
an
d
/o
r
ca
n
re
m
e
m
b
e
r
th
e
m
3
1
4
2
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
ts
1
0
0
0
In
cl
u
d
e
e
n
o
u
gh
d
e
ta
ils
(n
o
t
to
o
m
an
y
o
r
to
o
fe
w
)
0
0
1
2
3
B
as
e
d
o
n
th
e
co
n
te
n
t/
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
o
f
th
e
e
ve
n
ts
1
0
0
0
T
o
b
e
si
m
p
le
in
m
y
ac
co
u
n
t
1
0
0
0
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
o
th
e
r
e
ve
n
ts
0
0
2
3
2
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
o
th
e
r
e
ve
n
ts
1
0
1
0
I
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
ce
d
th
e
e
ve
n
ts
an
d
/o
r
ca
n
re
m
e
m
b
e
r
th
e
m
0
1
0
0
1
T
o
m
at
ch
th
e
o
th
e
r
e
ve
n
ts
2
0
0
0
T
o
b
e
si
m
p
le
in
m
y
ac
co
u
n
t
1
0
0
0
N
ot
e.
T
h
is
q
u
e
st
io
n
is
a
fo
llo
w
-u
p
to
th
e
q
u
e
st
io
n
‘H
o
w
d
e
ta
ile
d
d
o
yo
u
p
la
n
to
b
e
/w
e
re
yo
u
w
h
e
n
re
p
o
rt
in
g
th
e
tr
u
th
fu
le
ve
n
ts
’.
12 Haneen Deeb et al.
As in Study 1, thematic coding was used whereby the first author classified
participants’ open responses into categories, and the second coder allocated partici-
pants’ responses to these categories. Inter-rater reliability was substantial, j = .68.
Results
The questionnaires’ results (see Appendix S1) suggested that participantsweremotivated
to appear convincing and were genuine about the truthful events. High-context
participants were more likely than low-context participants to think they would be
believed by the interviewer, explained by the finding that they included more truthful
details in the false event.
Actual responses: lie position
A chi-square test between lie position (first, second, third, fourth) and culture (low-
context, high-context) revealed no significant differences, v2(3) = 1.53, p = .676,
Cramer’s V = 0.11, meaning that the positioning of the false event did not differ between
low-context (M = 2.73, SD = 1.05, 95% CI [2.47, 2.98]) and high-context participants
(M = 2.67, SD = 1.07, 95% CI [2.39, 2.94]). As in Study 1, relatively few participants
seemed to start the interviewwith the false event (Table 1). An exploratory analysis on the
whole sample did not reveal significant differences across positions, v2(3) = 6.95,
p = .073. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
We compared the occurrence of the first positionwith each of the other positions after
adjusting the p-value to .017 (.05/3) to avoid alpha level inflation. Participants were
significantly less likely to start the interview with the false event than to place it in the
second, v2(1) = 5.79, p = .016, or fourth position, v2(1) = 5.79, p = .016. Participants
were as likely to place the false event in the first as in the third position, v2(1) = 3.77,
p = .052.
The most frequently cited reasons that participants provided for the order of truthful
events (Table 3) were random order, chronological order, or memory-based (event they
remembered the most). As for the false event (Table 6), participants who started the
interview with the false event reported that this strategy would not be expected by the
interviewer or that they wanted to be done with the lie. Those who reported the false
event in the middle positions wanted to mix events so that the false event is less
detectable. Participants who lied at the end needed time to adjust to the interview before
they started lying.
Actual responses: detail
We classified the truthful events into those that were reported first, second, and third in
the interview. The first reported truthful event included an average of 27.73 details
(SD = 19.62), the second an average of 26.17 details (SD = 23.08), and the third an
average of 26.42 details (SD = 22.62). A repeated measures analysis revealed no
significant difference between the three means, F(2, 250) = 0.61, p = .546, g2 = .01.
Thus, we computed a detail mean score for the three truthful events, M = 26.78,
SD = 19.47. The detail mean score for the false event was 30.20 details (SD = 23.46).
A 2 (event: truthful, deceptive) 9 4 (lie position: first, second, third, fourth) 9 2
(culture: low-context, high-context) mixed ANOVA, with event as within-subject factor,
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culture and lie position as between-subject factors, and number of details for the false and
truthful events as dependent variable did not reveal any significant effects (all ps > .050).
These resultswere not consistentwith Study 1 results andHypothesis 4,which postulated
that participants will provide more details for the truthful events than the false event.
Intentions: detail
We examined participants’ planned amount of detail (pre-interview). A 2 (event: truthful,
deceptive) 9 4 (lie position: first, second, third, fourth) 9 2 (culture: low-context, high-
context) mixed ANOVA with event as within-subject factor, culture and lie position as
between-subject factors, and planned amount of false and truthful details as dependent
variable revealed a significant effect for event, F(1, 118) = 47.01, p < .001,g2 = .29,with
participants planning more details for the truthful events, M = 5.28, SD = 1.12, 95% CI
[5.08, 5.48], than the false event, M = 4.74, SD = 1.09, 95% CI [4.55, 4.93]. No other
significant effects emerged (all ps > .15). These results replicated Study 1 results.
Post-interview self-reports: detail
We conducted another mixed ANOVA with the same factors but with perceived amount
of detail provided (post-interview) as dependent variable. Participants thought they
provided significantly more details for the truthful events, M = 5.23, SD = 1.08, 95% CI
[5.04, 5.42], than the false event, M = 4.71, SD = 1.04, 95% CI [4.52, 4.89], F(1,
Table 6. Frequency of participants in Study 2 reporting the reasons for the chosen position of the false
event as a function of culture
Why did you choose to lie at that point during the interview? Low-context High-context
First position
Interviewer overlooks/does not expect interviewee
to lie at the beginning of the interview
7 5
I wanted to be done with the lie 6 3
Second position
I wanted to mix the truths and lies 10 8
I did not want to forget details of the lie 7 2
That depended on the sequence/content of the events 1 8
I wanted time to adjust to the interview 5 3
I wanted to be done with the lie 1 1
I wanted to gain the interviewer’s trust 0 1
Third position
I wanted to mix the truths and lies 15 7
I wanted time to adjust to the interview 6 4
If I lie at the beginning or end, that would make the lie too obvious 6 2
Fourth position
I wanted time to adjust to the interview 8 4
That depended on the sequence/content of the events 4 3
That gave me time to think about the deceptive details 5 1
I wanted to gain the interviewer’s trust 2 2
The interviewer would not expect me to lie at the end 2 2
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118) = 29.46, p < .001, g2 = .20. There was also a significant effect of culture, F(1,
118) = 4.54, p = .035, g2 = .04, with high-context participants believing they provided
more details for the truthful events,M = 5.40, SD = 1.05, 95% CI [5.13, 5.67], than low-
context participants, M = 5.08, SD = 1.09, 95% CI [4.81, 5.34], and high-context
participants believing theyprovidedmore details for the false event,M = 4.88, SD = 1.04,
95% CI [4.61, 5.15], than low-context participants, M = 4.55, SD = 1.01, 95% CI [4.30,
4.79]. All other effects were non-significant (ps > .18).
Tables 4 and 5, which illustrate participants’ justifications for the rated amount of
detail, show thatmany low- and high-context participantswanted to be detailed about the
events and also tried to provide a similar amount of detail for the events. This implies that
participants aimed to provide many details for both the truthful and false events. These
results were further corroborated by responses to a post-interview closed question that
explicitly asked participants if they tried (or not) to match the amount of detail for the
events. At least 71% of participants indicated that they tried to match the amount of detail
for the truthful and false events. Low- and high-context participants were equally likely to
provide a similar amount of detail, v2 (1) = 3.33, p = .068. Further, <6% of the
participants wanted to provide more truthful than false details, and 8%wanted to provide
fewer truthful than false details.
Correlations between planned and actual details
To better understand the results, we ran a correlational analysis between pre-interview
planned truthful and false details and the actual number of truthful and false details (see
Table 7). Participants who planned to report more truthful details also planned to report
more false details, and those who reported more truthful details in the interview also
reported more false details. Intentions correlated with actual details only when the actual
details provided were truthful. That is, participants who providedmore truthful details in
the interview also planned to provide more truthful and false details. The provision of
actual false details was not correlated with intentions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
When are lies told?
The overall findings show that lie-tellers differ in when they start lying in interviews, with
some data in Study 1 and Study 2 suggesting that they are less likely to lie at the beginning
Table 7. Correlations between pre-interview planned truthful and false details and actual truthful and
false details provided during the interview in Study 2
Planned
truthful
details
Planned
false
details
Actual
truthful
details
Actual
false
details
Planned truthful details .622** .267* .144
Planned false details .622** .231* .116
Actual truthful details .267* .231* .817**
Actual false details .144 .116 .817**
*p < .01; **p < .001.
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than at the end of the interview. These results applied to lie-tellers from both low- and
high-context cultureswhich implies that culture does not affect lie position. It may be – as
shown in Tables 1, 2, and 6 – that participants preferred to adjust to the interview and to
gain time to structure the lie in a convincing manner before they start lying. These results
are similar to those by Leal et al. (2016) who showed that lie-tellers are less likely to lie at
the outset (in an insurance claim in their study).
The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 2011; Armitage & Conner, 2001) posits that
lie-tellers’ intentions will likely predict their behaviour if they perceive that they have the
skills required to lie and that they possess control over the decision of when to lie.
However, if they lack the requisite skills and control over the decision environment, there
will be an intention–behaviour gap. In this case, they may plan when to lie in the
interview, but may end up lying at a different stage than intended. In our research, the
findings in Study 1 and Study 2 showed considerable overlap between planning and
behaviour. In both studies, 15% of the participants (lowest percentage) preferred to lie at
the beginning of the interview. In addition, participants in both studies were less likely to
lie in the first than in the fourth position andnodifference inpreference emergedbetween
the first and third positions. We did not ask participants in Study 2 about their intentions
on lie position as we did not want them to know the study purpose before the interview.
Future researchmay examine in a single study the extent towhich lie-tellers’ intentions on
lie position predict actual behaviour.
How are lies told?
Study 1 showed that lie-tellers from low- and high-context cultures planned to provide
more details for the truthful events than the false event, a finding replicated in Study 2 in
thepre-interview andpost-interviewquestionnaires, but these results emergedonlywhen
rating scaleswere used.Contradictory findings emerged in the actual interviews in Study 2
when participants (regardless of culture) provided a similar amount of detail for the
truthful and false events. At first glance, this discrepancy in the results of Study 2may seem
to stem from a discrepancy between self-reports and actual responses. However,
participants’ responses to questions other than rating scales (i.e., open and closed
responses) implied that they planned to provide a similar amount of detail for the events
(pre-interview questionnaire) and that they thought that they did indeed provide a similar
amount of detail (post-interview questionnaire). Also, the ratings for planned/perceived
amount of truthful and false details clustered around an average of 5 (on a 7-point scale),
and participants who chose this rating mentioned in their open responses that they were
keen on providing a similar amount of detail for the events (see Tables 4 and 5). We can
only speculate about these seemingly contradictory results. Perhaps the rating scales
which focused exclusively on planned/perceived amount of detail cannot be used to infer
the planned/perceived provision of a similar amount of detail as a strategy to appear
truthful.
The correlational analysis in Study 2 suggested that participants tried to provide a
similar amount of detail across events. Participants who planned to and who provided
more truthful details in the interview did the same for false details. The results from this
analysis also spoke to the intention–behaviour correlation. Participants who provided
more truthful details in the interviewwere the oneswhoplanned to providemore truthful
and false details. However, providing false details in the interviewwas not correlatedwith
planned amount of detail but onlywith providing truthful details in the interview. Perhaps
participants have planned to provide the same amount of detail for the truthful and false
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events but ended up matching their intentions for truthful details only. According to the
theory of planned behaviour, participantsmay have found itmore difficult to provide false
details in the interview as they had originally envisaged and planned.
The finding that lie-tellers provided a similar amount of detail across truthful and false
events (Study 2) did not support our hypotheses and previous findings by Palena et al.
(2019). The results can be explained by lie-tellers’ countermeasures. Lie-tellers are aware
that appearing consistent is commonly associated with honesty, so they try to maintain
consistency to make an honest impression (Granhag & Str€omwall, 1999). Deeb et al.
(2017) speculated that lie-tellers know they cannot be as detailed about a false event as
they canbe about a truthful event, so theymay try to reduce the amount of detail (repeated
details in their study) for the truthful event(s) so that itmatches the amount of detail for the
false event. Verigin et al. (2019) found that lie-tellers reported more details for the false
event so that the amount of detail matched that of the truthful event. Thus, lie-tellers in
their study used embedded lies to enrich the false event and to match it to the truthful
event. These two interpretations can be complementary such that lie-tellers reduce the
amount of detail they report about a truthful event while at the same time embedding
truthful aspects in a false event to make it more detailed. In our studies, we found that lie-
tellers used embedded lies as a convincing strategy (see Appendix S1) but we cannot
know from the current data if they tried to reduce the amount of detail for the truthful
events. Nonetheless, both interpretations imply that lie-tellers prioritize matching the
amount of detail across events.
Limitations
Participants were free to report events they experienced, and self-reports were the only
way to determine whether the truthful events were genuine. Similar procedures were
used in previous deception research (e.g., Leal, Vrij, Deeb, & Jupe, 2018; Taylor, Larner,
Conchie, & Menacere, 2017). We anticipate that participants adhered to instructions and
when they did not, theywere open about that (e.g., reporting using an embedded liewhen
they were instructed to use an outright lie). Also, some participants indicated they were
not 100% truthful about the truthful events, possibly because they did not remember all
the details of the experienced events so they tried to add details to fill inmemory gaps and
form a coherent narrative (Chabris & Simons, 2011). Participants reported in the post-
interview questionnaire of Study 2 that for the truthful events, 93% of the reported details
were truthful, and for the false event, 76% of the reported details were deceptive.
As shown in theAppendix S1,MTurk participants in Study 1weremoremotivated than
non-MTurk participants, which may be the result of the payment incentive offered to
MTurks but not to non-MTurks. However, both groups were highly motivated (average
scores were above the scale midpoint of 4).
Also, participants did not experience a real-world intelligence interview which may
have diminished the study’s ecological validity. However, previous research found that
inmates reported that they generally try to display similar behaviour when telling lies and
truths (Str€omwall & Willen, 2011) – the same strategy used by student samples (Leins,
Fisher, & Vrij, 2012). Therefore, with regard to matching the amount of detail, it seems
unlikely this counter-interrogation strategy would differ across settings.
In Study 1 and Study 2, the low-context sample was more homogeneous (coming
predominantly from the United States in Study 1 or the United Kingdom in Study 2) than
the high-context sample (coming from different cultures) which may have confounded
the results. Participants from aheterogeneous group aremore likely to vary on the cultural
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dimensions’ continuum than a homogeneous group. Nonetheless, it was interesting to
find that we reached similar results in both studies despite the heterogeneity of the high-
context sample.
Further, the high-context group had a lower English proficiency than the low-context
group in Study 2. This implies that the high-context groupmay have struggledmore in the
interview than the low-context group. Nonetheless, the analysis of the number of truthful
and false details in Study 2 showed that the two groups did not differ in the extent towhich
they reported details, so it can be inferred that language proficiency was not a barrier
during the interview.
In the experimental study (Study 2), an extensive rapport-building phase was not
introduced. Future research could examine the impact of rapport-building on lie position.
Would rapport-building make lie-tellers more confident so that they decide to lie earlier?
Conclusions
The current research implicates that lie-tellers seem to be less likely to lie at the beginning
than at the end of an interview. In addition, lie-tellers are likely to provide the same
amount of detail for false and truthful events in a single interview. This research is a first
step towards establishing research that assists practitioners in knowing when to start
using their time and cognitive resourceswithin interviews.We encourage future research
to examine diagnostic cues to deception that are not restricted by cultural nuances.
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